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to the conference table. Much would depend on whether one departure suited China's interest at that time.
70. In our view the acceptance of a measure of indirect Chinese control (the second course) will not at any time provide an acceptable means of withdrawal. On the face of it, it could have the merit of frustrating the worst Chinese intentions; and, by a process of gradual assimilation to Chinese control, it might help to avoid the disruptive, possibly violent, consequences of a sudden transfer of authority. But, as has been noted in paragraph 14 of cur Interim Report, it would put us entirely in the hands or the Chinese, both as to the manner and timing of our final departure; our bargaining position would be compromised when it came to seeking an eventual settlement; our people there would be hostages who would be used to extract the maximum concessions. We would be faced by serious economic and political r epercussions in Hong Kong in a situation of dwindling confidence. Additionally any lack of effective authority could raise acute political difficulties in relation to Ministers' responsibilities to Farliament for the administration of the territory. We might find that our control was so circumscribed as to prevent our making any attempt to discharge our responsibilitise to oven the vulnerable category of Chinese in Hong Kong.
71 From the third course the possibility of negotiating our withdrawal there could be no drawing back if the terms were unacceptable; our internal position in Hong Kong could not survive abortive negotiations, even if the Chinese were prepared to accept the situation. We might have to offer, during the negotiations or as part of the negotiated scttle- ment, to associate the Chinese with the administration of the Colony as a means of maintaining the internal security situation, but as a course to be pursued deliberately, even in a situation where the Chinese are showing a spirit of reasonable co-operation, it would carry some great dangers. From a position within the administration, the Chinese Jould have an infinite capacity to interfore. At any time they would be able to instigate trouble among their supporters and then to hamper or frustrate our efforts to deal with it. If
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/they were