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Chinese Government may then be in power. We have indicated in paragraph 79 why we do not consider the ceded territory to be viable without the leased territory (although this ought to be re-examined much nearer the time, taking account of changed circumstances).
If you feel that this strict interpretation of our terms of reference should be spelt out we suggest the following redraft of paragraph 1 of the paper:-
"An interim report (OPD(67)61) was prepared in July 1967 on the prospects for withdrawal from Hong Kong if it were suddenly forced upon us. We were further instructed (OPD(67)20th Meeting)
to examine policy in the long term, on the basis that we could not rely on remaining in Hong Kong on present terms until the lease of the New Territories lapsed in 1997 and should therefore
consider what adaptations of its status might be possible and desirable after the conclusion of
the present conflict in Vietnam. We have interpreted our terms of reference as excluding
from our consideration the situation that would
face us in 1997 should we then still be in
possession of Hong Kong. This is a situation which in our view can only be usefully examined
much nearer the time in the light of the attitude and intentions of whatever Chinese government may then be in power. #
Paragraph 2 (c)
The evidence that Hong Kong is a matter of some indifference to China is not conclusive. But as a small
enclave which they can feel confident of taking over "when the time is ripe", it clearly does not rank high in their present priorities. This is noted as only one of a number of factors tending towards the maintenance of the status quo
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