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HONG KONG: LONG-TERM STUDY
Suggested points for Secretary of State's
Introduction of Paper
(Revised following discussion in Planning
Committee on 20 March)
36
(i) The chances of avoiding a catastrophe in Hong Kong seem to be very small. This could happen at any time. From our point
of view every year passed is a year gained.
At the best, there
is going to be a crisis of confidence well before the expiry of the lease, probably in the early 1980s.
(ii) Hong Kong is a special case in the political evolution of our
Colonial territories. We cannot bring it to any form of independent status and must accept that it will eventually be
returned to China. The circumstances of this return are almost
bound to be painful. Ministers have been understandably concerned lest we might be overlooking opportunities for initiating policies now that might make the problem easier to deal with in the long term. It is, I think, a reasonable conclusion from the Report that there are no fresh initiatives that we can take in present circumstances that will make the problem of Hong Kong much less intractable in the longer term.
There can be no clean-cut, tidy solution to the predicament facing us in Hong Kong. We must expect Chinese hostility (even malevolence) and a desire on their part to pay off old scores. The Colony will remain a central factor in our future relations with China; but we shall not be able to dispose of it (to the possible benefit of those relations) other than by some agreement or understanding with China; disposal will, in fact, benefit our relations with China only if effected by agreement. Only by agreement are we likely to extricate ourselves in a manner which does not sacrifice interests and
obligations.
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
We cannot usefully seek such agreement or understanding with the present régime in China. There is no evidence at present that any future régime would be more accommodating. So long as the economic value of the Colony remains as sure as at present, the Chinese would not allow us to relinquish our responsibilities in Hong Kong. To relinquish those responsibilities in the face of Chinese wishes is not politically practicable.
Nevertheless both our broader interests in Sino/British relations and our interest in Hong Kong mean that we must do what we can to
/improve
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