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would be to gain indirect control over the administration of the
Colony. This we must avoid at any time as a step towards ultimate
withdrawal.
(a) There might be en opportunity to negotiate withdrawl
although we cannot see when this might arise. We should avoid
if at all possible any form of joint control of the administration
of the Colony prior to handing over eincs this would give the
Chinese an infinite capability for mischief and For Trustrating our
intentions.
A
(*) The courge best cuited to our interests would be an
informal and disavowable approach to the Chinese aimed at reaching
a tacit understanding about an eventual withdrawal at a quitable
apreed date,
(u) The Chinese response to a formal or informal approach
would depend very much on whether it suited their policy andl
interests at the time to take the Colony over and on the strength
of our position. The chances of a favourable responce would be
boat if the Chinese were genuinely anxious, for economic resвONS,
to take Hong Kong over with minimum damage to the economy;
negotiating position would be strongest if we sought to withdraw
when the Hong Kong economy wes ita normal buoyant self and there
was no Chinese pressupos
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(v) Our position 46, however, weak in that we have many
hostages in the Colony in terms of people and assets and no means
of bringing significant presuure to bear on China. Its strength
will rest on Hong Kong's economic value to China and on our ability
/to
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