STORET
clearly defined as "Chinese aggression",
Withdrawal
(n) Hong Kong'a future must overbally lie in China. This
io likely to become an issue in the 1980s (when confidence and the
economy must inevitably start to run dom) or earlier if, in the
meantime, Chinese pressures carry the indication that Chinabas a
serious intention to make our position untenable. But in prosent
Andeed, we cannot contemplate action
cireumstances wo noed not
to this end.
(c) When we do decide to withdraw we will face najoz
problems (come inecluble) in the discharge of our responsibilities
towards the Chinese section of the community (perticularly those
who are British subjects on who may be vulnerable to retaliation
istion
because of their loyalty to the British connection) and in the
maintenance of internal security during the period of withdrawal,
(p) The nature of these problems pointa to the need for
sone understanding with the Chinese, We can in any case put out
of our sinde any thought of an independent status for Hong Kong,
under U.N. auspices or otherwise, We shall have to hand over
Govereignty to China.
This would
(q) A unilateral decision on our part to withdraw would
be a course of last resort in present circumstances.
invite severe horassment by the Chinese who would not aoquiesce in
our withdravl at our own speed and in our own way; and we could
not prevent their interference. ha some future date it might be
used to bring the Chinese to the conference table.
(r). At present the only solution acceptable to the Chinese
SECRET
/would