TOP SECRET
•
Repeats
end 8(4)
on the timing of an approach all the considerations
indicate that we should make it as soon as there
emerges in China a regime with which we might do
business and before the Hong Kong economy starts to
run down in the 1980s; we should avoid any time when
the Hong Kong economy is showing weakness-or-we- are
under Chinese pressure
The Worst Case
re.)
(x) In the event of a Chinese military attack obviously
mounted with the objective of taking over Hong Kong
we would surrender the Colony with only a show of
resistance. Unremitting Chinese pressure short of a
military take-over could render our position untenable
and lead us to the conclusion that we must withdraw
with or without Chinese co-operation.
(y) In either event China might not accept our renunciation
force
as to main au
of control but might aim to establish a puppet British-
administration under their control. In such circumstances
it might be better to co-operate with them rather than to
sever, as in a formal way we could easily do, our political
and economic connections with the Colony.
(z) However these are decisions which can be taken only in
the light of the circumstances at the time. We consider
that whatever may happen in Hong Kong the Governor should
remain in charge of the civil administration of the
Colony and therefore that the Dormant Commission conferring
full administrative authority upon the Commander, British
Forces, should be revoked.
TOP SECRET
/J.