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عندله
in the Chinese leadership; but there is always the
danger that extremist elements may gain the ascendancy,
who would be prepared to sacrifice the economic benefits.
of nationt sensor
for doctrinal purity. Waslogical and nati vont to
Chinese Attitude and Intentions
il man Yan
a v long
time to
x
(g) The Chinese Government re
ament regards the whole of Hong Kong
(both ceded and leased areas) as Chinese territory to
be recovered (although they are on record as saying that
they will negotiate its return); and even if they allowed
the lease of the New Territories to run its full term,
we could not expect to re-negotiate it in 1997.
(h) At the moment they are prepared to accept the continuing
existence of the Colony because it brings them economic
and political advantages. The campaign of violence has
been abandoned for the present and they apparently
vring the motions of fomy tam stingh
the motims I
buny Pony Ting
The Gour to a
рольни of Subscriem
recognise that a Macao-type situation will take time
to achieve. Their immediate aims are to maximise their
commercial interests in the Colony and to concentrate
on broadening the base of their support among the people.
In certain circumstances, however, this policy might
quickly change for one of reducing the Colony to a
position of subservience or even of taking it over.
(i) we have virtually no means of bringing pressure to
thi
to chaing what was consell cation they decide on. bear upon China the should nevertheless examine the
Leef wundert reve scope for withdrawing services and facilities in the
11
event of another confrontation.
4
mon to
(j) It is unlikely that the Chinese would take Hong Kong
by direct military attack; it would be more in keeping
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/with