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Ciambal
goodwill, and this would almost certainly not be
forthcoming. If the situation had not quite reached that·
point but was imminent, it would be politically very
difficult to take a decision to withdraw.
86. In both cases we would seek to achieve some measure
of evacuation of those to whom we have a responsibility,
particularly of vulnerable elements of the population (as
already approved by Ministers).
outlined in
87. But whether we seek to surrender the Colony in the
face of military attack or seek to abdicate our position
by a unilateral decision to withdraw, the fact remains
The Chimen
that China may not accept or recognise our renunciation
of control.
They could pursue the tactic of neither
throwing us out nor allowing us to go; they could make no
attempt to take over the administration of the Colony.
Their object would be to retain a puppet British
administration under firm control.
(A elascio example of
this kind of tastie is, of course, the treatment of our OWA
and foreign business interests in Shanghai).
88.
C
We rehat we cannot say categorically whether in
Feel
reserve
Judgement
orically]
ali
these circumstances the Governor should be under instructions
to refuse all co-operation.
Much must depend on what prospects
there may be at the time for negotiating some accommodation
that would help to ameliorate the fate of those who were
locked in the Colony. For example there might be a case for
co-operating temporarily with the Chinese if we thought that
we held certain strong cards such as the continuance of
trading relations with the Western world (paragraph 77).
We could of course easily block thi move any time by
To set up a
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puppet адпатлати
: