TOP SECRET
(the
whose numbers would mushroom overnight among those
great majority) of the population who would see no
alternative but to remain; they would be joined by criminal
and hooligan elements. The morale of the Police Force
would dip sharply (if it did not disintegrate altogether);
the Force is preponderantly Chinese and its members would
understandably be looking over their shoulders. The task
of maintaining public order might devolve entirely on the
garrison and the likelihood is that it will prove impossible
to maintain control throughout the whole area of the Colony.
This would undoubtedly be the case if the Chinese Government
deliberately set out to foment the situation.
63. These two major problems present us with a conflict in
time scales. We should need as much time as we could get to
discharge our responsibilities to people. But the
difficulties we would face in circumstances of growing
disorder and economic confusion indicate that the period
of withdrawal should be as short as possible.
64. It is most unlikely (with the precedent of Shanghai
before us) that China would stand by while we stripped Hong
Kong of such people and assets as we wished to remove. We
can expect to be restricted both as to the time allowed and
in our freedom of action. Given the attitude of successive
Chinese Governments to our tenure of the Colony and to
foreign Governments in general, they are likely to want to
make our loss and discomfiture as great as possible. Nor is
it within our power, by military force, to hold them off
while we make the necessary arrangements. This likely
Chinese attitude and the nature of the problems we shall
/face
TOP SECRET
Page 120Page 121
a