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however, probably true that they would only be deterred in
this way from military action against Hong Kong which could
be clearly defined as "Chinese aggression". It is much less
likely that a deterrent of this sort could put an end to the
incitement to subversion in Hong Kong, since the Chinese would
calculate, quite correctly, that there is no point at which
such subversion can be considered as the justification for
nuclear retaliation against China.
53. Th Americans would like us to stay in Hong Kong for as
long as possible because of Hong Kong's value for
Ripolitive long
A§ 51
Arunod
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED THIS IS A COPY
and its political value as a Free World enclave on
Though the American
MY
the mainland of China.
reasons, however, they would be very unlikely to be willing to
give a public nuclear guarantee for Hong Kong nor for our own
reasons would we wish them to do so. There is, however, advantage
in trying to make the Chinese believe that the Americans are
involved in or committed to the defence of Hong Kong. The
continued presence of American warships in Hong Kong is helpful
in this connection. It might be helpful to seek American support
and understanding for the policies which we desire to adopt. The
advantages and disadvantages together with the ways and means of
doing so might be considered separately.
or domestic as well as international
most felucramp
54.
G. WITHDRAWAL
Hong Kong's geographical position, its preponderantly
Chinese population, the artificial nature of its economic
and political base
these factors, coupled with China's declared
claims and intentions, indicate that the Colony's future must
Pr
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/inevitably