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the lease of the New Territories expires is already beginning
to cast its shadow before it. This shadow will, in the best
circumstances, grow increasingly large and the life of Hong
both Kong, economic and social, will become increasingly stunted.
unalwommis 47. Annex B sets out some of the effects amongst them some
which are already apparent of the approach of 1997.
48. As the effects of the approach of 1997 tec
become
more marked
Hong Kong may require assistance from the U. K. in a number of
possibly
ways, (There is not only the pessit.
There is not only the possibility that economic assistance
and the buttressing
might be required if industry and trade stagnates but we may have.
to buttress the civil service and take action to ensure that
communications are maintained at an appropriate, level. This will
Sharad god in nibertsin elogiat
give m
lelograme. require sympathetic recognition by Departments of HM.G.of these
needs as they develop.
49.
Further study of this factor will be required in consultation
with a wider circle in Hong Kong than can be associated with the
and this can probably est be preparation of this paper and is being put in hand in Hong Kong.
-Although, iven the limited circle within which, for security
reasons, the study must be confined, the outcome must represent
individual opinions and will not be a study in depth.
50. Another aspect of the approach of 1997 is the bearing
this has on the social policies which we pursue in the
meantime. Here we are faced with a dilemma. We must
administer the Colony in a manner which accords with our own
concepts of social justice, while we must at the same time
recognise that to do so will widen the gap between Hong Kong
and China and will make the transition to Chinese rule more
/difficult
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