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Short-term Policies
K
43. The Chinese recognise that the events of 1967 showed they
could not achieve dominance except by the use of violence to a
degree which would have gravely impaired Hong Kong's value to them.
This price they were not prepared to pay. Their present policy
is to expand their commercial interests in the Colony and to
concentrate on building up their support. To this end they are
rebuilding the local communist apparatus and will seek to use this
by persuasion, propaganda, intimidation apparatus to achieve
dominant position in the Colony. A heightening of the level of
propaganda would probably precede another serious attempt to
achieve this dominance. The nature and intensity of propaganda
about Hong Kong, both within the Colony and outside, should
therefore serve as an indicator of Chinese intentions.
Our Ability to Influence Chinese Attitudes and Policies
gr must be fewymist In general it is only realistic to recognise that our
Amendetik.
to brag
a
ability capability of Jbringing influence or pressure to bear upon Ching
modely her pornicus in
побла with the intention of modifying theif policies in a direction
15 mnmnt of indeed it exiers -
to
то
favourable to us is extremely limited, if not non-existent
s[it
Nevertheless it will remain true that we provide China with
certain services and facilites in the field of commerce, shipping,
could of necessy
We
necerm 'to]
banking and insurance which would be open to us to interrupt.
bugath Do no
We cannot believe that)Action
on these lines would
more than
inconvenience the Chinese and in any case we are inhibited from it by
taking action in some of these fields by the adverse effect it
would have on Hong Kong's economy. However at a moment of renewed
tension, for example, if the Chinese mounted another confrontation,
might
Such actin
As we may wish to consider measures of this nature
measures of this nature which we might
means
/calculate Yo
Li
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