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X
with their theory of indigenous revolution to create,
by local action, a breakdown of authority in the
Colony.
(k) As 1997 approaches confidence will inevitably drain
away with adverse political and economic effects making
it increasingly difficult for us to maintain our
position.
Fough
This will raise some very difficult problems
in the spheres of economic and social policy and in the
of these problems
public service; in which studies (necessarily conducted
can best be
within a limited circle) are being put in hand in
Hong Kong.
American Involvement, (Paras $1-53)
(1) The Americans make great use of Hong Kong and would wish
at leasi
Peking not
(m) Fear of American retaliation (which we might foster) may
us to stay, as long as there is a commonest Government in recognised by them.
inhibit the Chinese from taking any action that could be
clearly defined as "Chinese agression". he might consider separately whether we should seeks American support and understanding Withdrawal for the policies we desire to adopt".
(Paras 54-83)
(n) Hong Kong's future must eventually lie in China. This
is likely to become an issue in the 1980s (when
confidence and the economy must inevitably start to
run down) or earlier if, in the meantime, Chinese
pressures carry the indication that China has a serious
intention to make our position untenable.
But in
present circumstances we need not
A
indeed, we cannot
contemplate action to this end.
(o) When we do decide to withdraw we will face major
problems (some insoluble) in the discharge of our
responsibilities towards the Chinese section of the
community (particularly those who are British subjects
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/or