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due course, e.g. by violence or agitation.
X (e) We would not hamper Chinese attempts to win over
the population by peaceful persuasion provided they
are kept within such bounds as would enable us to overlook
ignore them.
(f) We would welcome confidential advance information
on when they themselves think a take-over would be
appropriate and the method by which it might be
effected; we would try to fall in with them on the
clear understanding that we could not accept
(i) humiliation, (ii) disorder, or (iii) denial of
opportunity to protect those to whom we had a duty.
(g) Both sides would have to accept that overt attitudes
towards each other might have to be apparently
hard
somewhat aerimonious and would recognise that the
This
aorimony was contrived.
(h) The one thing we would not accept is a situation in
which the Hong Kong Government would become a
Chinese puppet under duress.
73. This course would have many dangers. It might merely
encourage the Chinese to pursue, without deviation, their
aim to reduce Hong Kong to subservience. It would have to
be pursued with the utmost secrecy and care over a long
period. And we could not be sure that the link in the channel
of communication in these difficult and tricky circumstances
would adequately serve its purpose. But it does minimise
some of the dangers of a formal approach (as noted in
paragraph 66 above) and particularly it provides us with the
means of drawing back if we should be rebuffed. It enables
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/the