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(i) to abdicate our position by unilateral action,
declaring our intention to go in a specified period
of time with or without an indication of our
readiness to talk to the Chinese about it;
(ii) to accept indirect Chinese influence over the way
in which we administer Hong Kong (ie, a iacae
type situation) with a view to ultimate transference
of control;
(iii) to approach the Chinese formally with a view to
negotiating our withdrawal. This might include (but not initially) an offer to consider an interim
period of dual Anglo-Chinese control of the Colony; (iv) to approach the Chinese informally with a view to
reaching a covert understanding with them about our
eventual withdrawal at a suitable agreed date.
68. Given the character and attitude of the present regime
in China, the only course to which we could be sure of the
Chinese responding at the present time would be our
Chinesey,
Some measure of indirect control
acceptance of a Macao-type situation (the second course).
Any attempt at present to abdicate our position by unilateral action (the first course) would meet with a sharp and hostile
Chinese reaction and we would be subject to the maximum
harassment and humiliation in our attempt to extricate
ourselves; it would also quickly lead to chaos within the
Colony. We certainly could not hope today to engage the Chinese in genuine and reasonable negotiations (the third course).
69.
Unilateral action to withdraw (the first course) might
be the only course open to us in circumstances in which we
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/felt