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that the viability of its somewhat artificial
economy can no longer be maintained. This could
occur because of restrictions imposed by importing
countries on her trade or (as could be the case any
time after 1980) because the economy starts to run
down as the expiry of the lease draws nearer and
confidence, particularly business confidence,
gradually ebbs away.
56. We might feel obliged to withdraw following a prolonged
period of physical pressure by local Communists. This, even
without direct support from China, might make our position
impossible not so much because we might lose the support
of the Chinese population and control of internal security,
but because economic disruption and, above all, loss of
business confidence within and without the Colony might slowly
sap its economic health. However, the events of last year
have shown that, in the absence of any sign that China intends
to end our rule in Hong Kong or that we are prepared to go,
local confidence and the confidence of the outside world have
not been seriously impaired (and may indied have been temporarily enhanced).
57.
We would have seriously to consider withdrawal if such
pressure had China's support in furtherance of the aim to
reduce us to a position of subservience (as indicated in
Section E). The means available to China (which would no
doubt be applied simultaneously) might take an economic form
(e.g. denial of food and water supplies, promotion of strikes
or stoppages of work) or might be political e.g. open
encouragement of subversion and violence among local Communists
and their supporters, together with a clear indication of
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/China's