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Short-term Policies
43. The Chinese recognise that the events of 1967 showed they
could not achieve dominance except by the use of violence to a
degree which would have gravely impaired Hong Kong's value to them.
This price they were not prepared to pay. Their present policy
is to expand their commercial interests in the Colony and to
concentrate on building up their support. To this end they are
rebuilding the local communist apparatus and will seek to use this
apparatus to achieve
by persuasion, propaganda, intimidation а
dominant position in the Colony. A heightening of the level of
propaganda would probably precede another serious attempt to
achieve this dominance. The nature and intensity of propaganda
about Hong Kong, both within the Colony and outside, should
therefore serve as an indicator of Chinese intentions.
Our Ability to Influence Chinese Attitudes and Policies [Tak mislys.]
—
In general it is only realistic to recognise that our
capability of bringing influence or pressure to bear upon China
with the intention of modifying their policies in a direction
favourable to us is extremely limited, if not non-existent.
Nevertheless, it will remain true that we provide China with
certain services and facilites in the field of commerce, shipping,
banking and insurance which it would be open to us to interrupt.
We cannot believe that action on these lines would do more than
inconvenience the Chinese and in any case we are inhibited from
taking action in some of these fields by the adverse effect it
would have on Hong Kong's economy. However at a moment of renewed
tension, for example, if the Chinese mounted another confrontation,
we may wish to consider measures of this nature which, we might
/calculate
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