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that
ha
dimanding a ban on three comply with a Chinese ultimatum on the treatment of-
newspapers be lifted, stis probable
communist Press representatives in Hong Kong, Recent
exchanges with the Chinese indicate that members of the
British Mission and also possibly other British subjeets
Were
in China are being held as hostages by the Chinese in order la vy
The Chinese might still hope that to secure concessions on Hong Kong. (it is just as likely, however, detention of other British Subyect's will helps to achieve their objectives though in view of their that they would similarly use our Mission, etc. to bring pressure. failure to use the Rission for this purpose this may be largely to satisfy their supporters to bear on us for other ends)—–
in Hong Kong.
X Economic
5. Our exports to Hong Kong in 1967 were £62 million f.o.b.
(of the same order as our exports to Japan), a proportion of
which goes on to other markets through Hong Kong. If the
Hong Kong market was lost to us, we might save what we could
sell direct in the markets hitherto supplied through Hong Kong,
but clearly a lot of these frustrated exports would be
difficult to sell elsewhere at first.
6. Our imports from Hong Kong in 1967 were £89 million c.i.f.,
of which £34 million was in clothing and £18 million in textiles.
If these imports were totally stopped, there would be some
substitution, particularly from other Eastern suppliers, of
all types of goods; in the case of textiles, which are subject
to quantitative control, such substitution could be regulated.
We derive some economic advantage in being able to obtain cheap
supplies from Hong Kong. Their loss might lead to a rise in
prices of certain goods in the United Kingdom but there would,
of course, be relief from the embarrassment (mainly political)
caused by the competition of Hong Kong exports with our textile
and certain light industries.
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17.