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the law and the authority of the Hong Kong Government were among the principal communist tactics during confrontation; and they have not given up such non-violent means of undermining the authority of tho Hong Kong Government. They could at any time reactivate (and if there is no deterrent might well do so) a campaign inciting the police to disobey orders and the public to disregard the law. For this reason, I think we must let the Governor retain on a permanent basis as much of this regulation as he considers necessary for dealing with the problem of simmering communist activity, which has been with us since 1950 and is surely going to remain indefinitely.
Regulations 50 and 51 provide for control of the entry and departure of ships and aircraft (Regulation 50) and for the detention of ships, aircraft and vehicles and of the persons in them (Regulation 51) - in the public interest. These powers have already been included in the Public Order Ordinance of 1967 (in Sections 34 and 35) and there has been no public criticism, e.g. by "Justice", of the relevant provisions.
In UK legislation powers to control the entry and departure of ships, etc., rest on factors relating to safety, etc.; there is no general power to act "in the public interest". However, in the view of legal advisers, Hong Kong could reasonably say that the wiđor powers are not objectionable.
Legal advisers consider that permanent legislation conferring powers of detention over ships, aircraft and their occupants would be more difficult to defend and have suggested that the powers should be confined to those of arrest and deportation in circumstance where the restrictions provided for in Regulation 50 (and now in Section 34 of the Public Order Ordinance) have been contravened.
Emergency Regulations 50 and 51 have been in force since 1950 and 1958 respectively. In my view there is ample justification, in the reasons for their introduction and the history of their use, for their continuance indefinitely as part of the permanent legislation. Regulation 50 was introduced to deal with the problem of C.P.G. and Nationalist military aircraft (particularly the latter) landing at Hong Kong in a deliberately provocative and compromising fashion.
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