a formal statement of firmness on our side in
ao likely as not to drive the Chinese into a
hopelessly entrenched position. It would be a
pity to prejudice in this way the prospect,
however slight, of an improvement in the
situation of British subjects after the
release of Grey.
5. Both you and the mission in Peking recom-
mend that we moderate our referendes to
"improving Sino-British relations" In our
•
eyes the phrase has had little more than
ritual moaning and it is difficult on the face
of it to believe that simple repetition of the
phrase, în the face of much hard evidence to
the contrary, can have led the Chinese to take
it as an indication of readiness on our side
to capitulate on specifio ionues. However, we
are certainly roady to accept your advice and
shall in future play these references down. In
addition we shall be careful in briefing the
press and other contacts on the progress of
Sino-British relations to avoid giving the
impression that Cino-British relations are
improving faster than is in fact the case.
6. We accept that conversations of a lens
formal kind with the Chinese could provide a
convenient occasion for putting across the
appropriate messago about our intentions.
do not dispute the aptness of the points in
your paragraph 7. We are concerned only to
choose our moment well. The need to head tho
Chinese off a collision course over prisonera,
We