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time will serve our purposes which are, in order
of priority:
1) to see Mr. Grey safely released in October;
*
ii) to head off any Chinese demands for the release of
batches of prisoners in Hong Kong in exchange for
other British subjects.
I admit that there can be two views on our tactics in
this matter. However, on balance I come down in favour
of Mr. Denson's recommendation that the less said at this
stage the better. If the Chinese really believe us to
be weakening over Hong Kong, this is something that, in
the perspective of the next eight weeks, we should not
necessarily be eager to correct. For the Chinese must
presumably see the release of Mr. Grey as promised as the
initial carrot to start us on the path of repeated
concessions. By demonstrating to the Chinese in advance
that the Grey oase is sui generis and is not the prelude
to such concessions we risk depriving them of a major
motive for letting him go.
(a) Differences of view with Hong Kong
I agree that it remains vitally important that we should
continue to do nothing to encourage the communists to
believe that there are differences of view between
London and Hong Kong. This is something which to
emphasise to the Chinese can only be counter-productive.
Any such assertion would immediately lead them to conclude
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