b)
(There may well still be a case for the premature
release of the eleven, but now it can be properly
based only on the desirability of shortening Mr. Grey's
ordeal or of making some general gesture of readiness
for accommodation in Hong Kong.)
The statement should help to allay the apprehensions
which the Governor of Hong Kong has understandably
expressed in the past about the situation with which he
would be confronted were he to release the eleven
prematurely and the Chinese were not to match this by
the release of Mr. Grey. (However the Governor has in
practice accepted, in part as the result of a communication
through the covert channel last February, that the release
of the eleven was a firm price for Mr. Grey.)
In short, the statement has facilitated our handling of the
case in that whether the decision is to let matters take their
course in Hong Kong until October or to press for the premature
release of the eleven, we can proceed on either course in a
Bomewhat easier frame of mind.
6. As far as the public is concerned I think we should treat
the statement unspectacularly. In press criticism of our
handling of the case, the December statement has been generally
interpreted as meaning that the Chinese would release Mr. Grey
if the eleven were released. Though we have struck a note of
caution with those directly concerned we have been careful not
to emphasise our doubts in public. If we now give prominence
to Ma's statement we shall certainly be asked whether we accept
SECRET