of a commitment. Either we were being over-cautious, or
the Chinese, for their own purposes, have now decided to
move from a position of some equivocation to a considered
declaration of readiness for a bargain. The former is
doubtful since particularly on an issue like this the
Chinese could be expected to choose their words with care.
If the latter case, the presumption must be that they wish
to influence us towards the early release of the eleven
newsworkers. The best interpretation to be put on their
motives is that, keen to get the Grey affair out of the way,
they are responding to the indication given by the reduction
of Wong Chak's sentence that we were ready to play our part
in settling the affair by October at the latest. Less
charitably they may judge that an unequivocal assurance of
this kind, if it becomes known, is likely to increase
pressure on us to release the eleven immediately.
5. If - as I think we must - we accept the assurance at its
face value, there are two implications of substance for our
handling of the Grey affair.
a) The statement provides an answer to the argument put
forward that while the premature release of the eleven
Mr.
might in the past have secured the release of/Grey or
might even do so now, we should not conclude that their
release on their due dates in September and October
would necessarily be regarded by the Chinese as an
adequate "concession" for the release of Mr. Grey.
SECRET
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