0003160 G.F. 316
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and determination to wage a long drawn out and insidious campaign; their ability to rebuild in 1968 sone at least of the machinery shattored in 1967 reflects their determination and resilience. major economic slump or a serious internal security situation could greatly strengthen their position; but the real and more izainont dangor is that the memory of 1967 will fade from the public mind (one prominent newspaper has already mistakenly commented that 1967 should be forgotten), and as this happens their influence with the population will grow if they show themselves to be apparently on their side,
4. In the face of this threat we must avoid complacency. Equally we must avoid the risk of underestimating the strength of our position and our ability to win and keep public support by good and progressive administration, supported by wider contact with the public through both personal and mass media.
5.
The purpose of the paper issued with this letter is to underscore the basic strength of our position with a view to stimulating departments to exploit that strength to the utmost, not only because it is the proper function of the Government to act and plan progressively, but also because it is by so doing that we shall deny opportunities to the Communists to gain by insidious methods what they failed to gain by pressure and violence,
6.
The paper is intended primarily for the eyes of departmental heads; but it is a working document and the best use can be made of it only if its message reaches other senior staff at the policy-making levels. You are therefore authorised to allow members of your directorate - but not, without specific approval from the Defence Secretary, more junior staff to read the paper; copies of it may not, however, be made and this letter and the paper should remain in your own custody. In case it may be considered that these instructions are too restrictive I should point cut that, though the conclusions may seem obvious to many, the methods by which we propose to counter and forestall attempts at Communist subversion would be information of much value to subversive elements.
7.
I should like you to bear this paper in mind when you are devising or reviewing policies, practices and procedures within your aroa of responsibility. Indeed, I hope we can go further, and initiate as soon as may be practicable a review of such matters to determine how far they are consonant with the principles that the paper seeks to establish. The Secretariat will be willing to participate in this exercise so far as it is practicable and desirable for it to do so. In fact I have it in mind that additional roviow papers on specific subjects
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