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handling of the Grey case, possibly with the Chinese but
almost certainly with sectors of the public here.
(a) The Chinese are bound to be impressed by our willingness
to bend the law in respoet of the Krogers and,
particularly in the sour climate of Sino-Soviet
relations, to contrast it with what has been said to
them about the impossibility of prematurely releasing
convicted prisoners in Hong Kong. This may well lead
to further pressure by them in the matter of the whole
problem of convicted "confrontation" prisoners in Hong
Kong, and possibly even to attempts to strike bargaine
for other British subjects now in detention in China.
We must accept that there is some risk that they might
put up their price for Mr. Grey to include convicted
prisoners other than the newaworkers. But I personally
doubt if they will do so in view of the firmness with
which they have established the link between Mr. Grey and
the newsworkers. (In any case, all this is perhaps
rather a possible argument for firmness and delay in the
Brooke case rather than for immediate concessions in the
Grey case.)
(b) Those in this country directly involved in the Grey case
(i.e. Reuters, certain sections of the press and the Grey
family) may press the more strongly for an early bargain
with the Chinese. But I am by no means certain that
public opinion generally would come to the conclusion that
because we had in very special circumstances made
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