simply about a loss of face but about the erosion of public
support for and confidence in the Hong Kong Government's
ability to withstand communist pressure. And our only
possible gain from these risks would be the curtailment of
Mr. Grey's ordeal by a matter of 3-4 months.
5歳 There is an important secondary argument against our
trying to insist on the release of the newsworkors against
the better judgement of the Governor. In the storm of
criticism likely to arise in Hong Kong, it would almost
certainly become public knowledge that the releases had been
against the advice of the Governor and others bearing
responsibility on the spot. It could have most unfortunate
effects in Hong Kong if the impression were thus to be created
of a serious divergence of view between the Hong Kong
authorities and ourselves on a matter pertaining to the
security of Hong Kong.
7. There is a further much less considerable argument
against premature releases. Relations of other British
subjects detained in China e.g. the Gordon Zamily, would
claim that we had in effect done a deal with the Chinese to
secure the release of Mr. Grey, and would press us to propose
further deals to the Chinese (involving other convicted
prisoners in Hong Kong) to secure the release of our other
nationals.
8. What bearing has the Brooke case on all this?
There
is no doubt that public knowledge of a bargain with the
Russians over Mr. Brooko will pose problems for us in the
SECRET
5