CONFIDENTIAL
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in gaol is now down to eleven. But notwithstanding this, the NCNA in Hong Kong say that Mr. Grey will not be
released until all these journalists are released.
What is not clear to us is whether the Chinese will release
him even if we release the eleven journalists. A case
could perhaps be made out for the premature release of the
majority of these journalists subject to certain conditions.
But a difficulty was that one of the journalists, the one
not due for release until 1971, was sentenced for carrying
an offensive weapon, etc. If, therefore, he in particular
(and for that matter the others) was released prematurely
it could weaken the position of the Hong Kong authorities in
the future maintenance of law and order. It would destroy
the faith of law abiding citizens in the colony. There
were also wider aspects to consider. Clearly we must
avoid getting ourselves manoeuvred into a situation similar
to that which has occurred in Macao where the Portuguese
now find themselves the puppets of the Chinese. Giving
in to Chinese demands over Mr. Grey could also jeopardize
the safety of other Britons in China, since they too might
be taken as hostages in the knowledge that we would always
pay a price for their release. In addition, the probability
could not be ruled out that if other Governments got the
idea that we were always ready to pay a price for hostages
it might jeopardize the safety of Britons (particularly
the foreign correspondents of newspapers) living in other
CONFIDENTIAI