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2.
3. BY MID DECEMBER WE MIGHT HAVE FAIRLY CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT
COURSE 8 WAS THE MINIMUM PRICE FOR GREY, BUT WE COULD EXPECT
STRONG RESISTANCE FROM THE COVERNOR, ESPECIALLY IF THERE WAS
NO FIRM GUARANTEE THAT REMISSION WOULD SECURE THE RELEASE OF
GREY. IN ANY CASE, I PERSONALLY WOULD BE
NOST RELUCTANT TO RECOMMEND TO MINISTERS THAT WE SHOULD DEND
TO CHINESE PRESSURES IN THIS WAY.
I NOW SEE LESS MERIT THAN BEFORE IN COURSE C. IF THE
CHINE E WERE STANDING OUT FOR THE RELEASE OF LO ALONE WOULD
NOT HAVE MUCH EFFECT AS A GESTURE. AND IF LO VERE RELEASED
VITHOUT RESULTS, THE GOVERNOR WOULD UNDERSTANDALLY BE MORE
RELUCTANT TO CONSIDER ANY FURTHER NEASURES OF CLUNENCY,
5. TO FUT COURSE O FORMALLY TO THE CHINESE, WITH THE
PUILLITY THAT LIGHT RESULT, LOULD DIPOSE US TO THE CHARGE
CF USING THE DETAINEES AS POLITICAL PAINS AN ISSUE WHICH HAS
BECOME MORE SENSITIVE SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF REAR S LETTER.)
IT COULD PROBABLY ONLY BE PUT INFORMALLY THROUGH COVERT CHANNELS
IN HONG KONG, .GASS 3 PRELIMINARY REACTIONS WERE NOT UNFAVOURABLE PROVIDED SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS PERMITTED THE RELEASE OF A
LARGE ENOUCH NUMBER, 17 MIGHT HAVE SOME ATTRACTIONS FOR THE
COMMUNISTS BOTH IN HONG KONG AND PEKING. BUT WE HAVE NOT REALLY
MUCH OF A BARGAINING POSITION.
6. VIETRER COURSE E REMAINED FEASIBLE IN MID DECEMBER
MIGHT DEPEND AS MUCH ON THE PRESSURES OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE
UK AS ON ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE,
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