000316Q G.F. 316
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17.
Mr. Murray said that if Grey was not released shortly after Hsueh was released, there would be increasingly strong
ressure on Ministers to take some action. Witain about three ecks Mr. Cradock would have to be instructed to make renewed representations to the C.P.3. Then, or even before, we mi ht receive further indications of what the final price was. If the C.F.. make it clear that the price was all 14 newspaper workers, Hong Kong might be asked to consider releasing them - although Mr. Murray stressed that he fully appreciated the risks and would personally be very reluctant to recommend to Ministers that we should bend to pressure of this kind.
18.
Mr. Cradock put the argument for an earlier release of certain categories of convicted prisoners, bota as a means of securing the release of Grey and on the more general groun.s of bringing about a detente. The confrontation prisoners (some would not complete their sentences until 1974) were a continuing obstacle to improved Sino/British relations. In the Hong Kong context they were a continuing irritant and while they remained, tension would always be higher and the possibility of local trouble greater. Earlier release, say at the end of 1968 or in early 1969, when some 2/3rds of convicted prisoners had served their full terms and more than a year after violence was called off, would not be seen as an act of weakness.
19.
H.E. said that we could consider remission on individual cases, and had already remitted the sentences of some young persons. The prisoners had all committed criminal offences. Remission of large numbers would cause difficulties with the Judiciary. Moreover, militant communists were still being committed to prison for offences against law and order. In the strictly local context, he did not, despite kr. Cradock's arguments, accept that the relcase of groups of convicted prisoners would be in the interests of Hong Kong. Having released one group, where could one stop? Hong Kon, would be seen to have yielded to blackmail. Horse-trading was at times acceptable, but Grey was not a Hong Kong man. Mr. Murray emphasized that Grey was detained as a consequence of "confrontation" in Hong Kong.
20.
It was agreed that it would be very hermful if the 14 men were released and Grey was not subsequently released.
21.
It was agreed that bargaining for the release of detainees was rather less objectionable, and that if there were any who could safely be released they might be used to attempt to secure the release of Grey.
Education
22.
Mr. Cradock emphasized the sensitivity of the comunists concerning education. Action against peaceful communist education or the rigat to study the Thoughts of Chairman kao would produce violent reaction.
23.
H.E. confirmed that direct action to close communist schools was not contemplated, although they were regularly inspected. But Hong Kong was concerned about the number of children (admittedly a small percentage) who were receiving an inadequate education. Hong Kong was increasing the number of primary and secondary schools; but most children in communist schools came from communist homes and could therefore not be attracted to non-communist schools.
24.
It was agreed that communist education might be shown to be so inadequate that Government was obliged to intervene; but this was not at present contemplated. Improvement of non- communist schools was the best long-term policy.
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