0003160 G.F. 316
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Mr. Murray reiterated that it was accepted in London that security was paramount, provided always the reasons were trong. Detainees should not be treated as political pawns. But London hoped that Hong Kong could in any case let most of them out. In discussion it was agreed that, if the Governor decided that security considerations permitted the release of some detainees, some political advantage could be achieved by the timing of their release. Moreover H.E. suggested that, if the Chinese tried to insist on the release of some convicted prisoners in return for Grey (see paragraph 21 below), it might be worth exploring whether a bargain could not be concluded by offering some detainees instead.
13.
Mr. Cradock, while accepting the security argument, questioned whether released detainees would constitute a threat to security in present circumstances while the communist line of non-violence was applied. Kany trained communists had been at liberty all along or were being released continuously from the prisons. Moreover the political aspect was very important. The Chinese probably understood some of our difficulties in remitting the sentences of prisoners, but appreci ed also that we could release the detainees if we wished. keleese would materially assist the detente.
Mr. Grey and Convicted Frisoners
14.
A message nad been received informally from the Chinese:-
(a)
(b)
indicating that Grey would be released (and, more doubtfully, other matters settled) only if all the 14 newspaper workers were released. This should not be represented
publicly as a bargain, because this would cause difficulties for Feking;
suggesting that discussions on future "de-escalation" by both sides might be fruitful.
15.
It was accepted that the 14 newspaper workers might well be the asking price for Grey, and was possibly the result of pressure from Hong Kong communists. The question was whether this was the final price or whether, if the Chinese were firmly told that it was out of the question, they might quietly drop it. Mr. Murray remarked that he had always thought that there were four conceivable prices that the Chinese might try to exact:-
release of Hsuch (due in any case for release on 16th November);
(a)
(b)
release of both N.C.N.A. men (Hsuen and Lo);
(c)
release of all 14 communist newspaper workers;
(d)
release of a large number of convicted prisoners.
16.
It was agreed that the initial reply should be negative; that the 14 newspaper workers were properly in prison for crimes; that an exchange could present us with difficulties with the Judiciary; that we could not conceal the fact that the bargain was in fact an exchange.
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