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0003160 G.F. 316
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After further discussion it was generally agreed that:-
(a)
(b)
firmness was essential (it being recognised
that there was room for difference of opinion on the application of the policy);
provocation should continue to be avoided (although there was a limit to toleration in the matters of schools and Fress);
(c)
too strong action would be likely to hinder the moderates in Fcking and drive the extremists into active intervention;
(d)
(e)
(f)
good relations with the present regime in China were not to be expected; the communists were engaged in a long-term struggle to increase their influence in Hong Kong; but it would be in everyone's interests to return to a state of mutual tolerance, and we should do what we could to bring this home to the Chinese authorities in Peking;
action to e-escalate", provided that security was not impaired, would be advantageous;
the Government had to take into account public opinion in Hong Kong, which was generally in favour of strong action against communist pressure, but which could in some measure be influenced by appropriate publicity.
Detainees
8.
Mr. Murray said that it had been agreed in London in discussions with the Governor that, while security was paramount, the release of detainees could make a substantial contribution to "de-escalation".
9.
On security, Mr. Murray said that one would have to take into account the ability of the individual to make trouble and also the effect of releases on the population. On the former, for every detainee there were several potential trouble- makers at liberty. On the latter, there were two possibilities to be considered; releases could undermine confidence among the population; or alternatively they could increase confidence by showing that the Government was strong enough to permit them
10.
The official view in London was that, subject to genuine security requirements, London,would like Hong Kong to release the detainees. This would be a contribution to the detente.
11.
H.E. said that the detention of some trouble-makers made other potential agitators more circumspect. Security and public confidence were particularly important factors in respect of New Territories communists especially in the Sai Kung area. Nonetheless Hong Kong had managed to let some detainees out
(including two this week) and hoped to release another two or three later this month. There would be loss of confidence if large numbers were let out together.
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