damage confidence (and the economy) of the territory.
Any Chinese reaction would tend to mar the enjoyment
and purpose of the visit. A visit might provide the
Chinese with a means of putting pressure upon us to
achieve other aims of Chinese policy (e.g. withdrawal of
facilities enjoyed by American forces in Hong Kong)
With reluctance we have tended in the past to go along
with the Foreign Office view that a visit by The Queen
would be unwise.
4.
In September last year the Governor wrote to
Sir Saville Garner suggesting that a visit by The Queen October/November/December in the last three months of 1968 to open the Plover Cove
Water Scheme could perhaps be regarded as more acceptable,
in that it would be a visit for a particular purpose and
not in the manner of a general "display of sovereignty".
This letter has unfortunately been mislaid, but a copy is
now available. Although steps have been taken to obtain
the considered views of the Foreign Office, these have not been
received. Our preliminary conclusions (after informal
discussions with the Foreign Office) are that the distinction
drawn by the Governor is not one that theChinese would be
C
likely to recognise; that, given the unpredictability of
hopeful Chinese attitudes, we could be no more helpful now than we
were in 1964 of avoiding the difficulties and dangers then
apparent; and that since the Governor's letter was written
there have been (a) developments in China which must tend
to increase the dangers of Chinese unpredictability and (b)
the Macao incident which provides an illustration of the way
in which Chinese anti-Colonialism ben manifest itself.
5.
However, at tomorrow's meeting of the Royal Visits'
Committee it is suggested that, while airing the arguments
set out above for and against the inclusion of Hong Kong in
Her Majesty's proposed tour, the aim might be to keep the decision
open for the present in the absence of the considered views of
the Foreign Office.
A short note on the Plover Cove Water Scheme is attached.
6.
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