ட
CONFIDENTIAL
(1941/67)
F.1941/20
(1964)
SCEIVED IN. CHIVES No.31
3 APR 1967
-D22/2
Dear Ente,
Many thanks
a possible visit
P.W.
X Submi
The Office of the British with pp.
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING
29 March, 1967.
3
or your letter (FD 22/2) of 8 March about
y The Queen to Hong Kong. The Governor
spoke to me about this informally over a year ago.
relations should
L
2. I have looked up the previous papers and though I agree 24 that all the risks mentioned by my predecessor in his telegram
No. 1234 of 16 December, 1964, still exist, I would rate them rather lower than he did. Of course, a lot must depend on- political atmosph re at the time, and I can only give my guess according to the onditions as they are now. If Sino/British
n the future noticeably deteriorate he context of Hong Kong and Viet-Nam) then I suppose the risks automatically increase. As I see it the main risk is tha: mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) of Garvey's telegram referred to above. We cannot be sure what will happen . between the date the public announcement and the date of the visit. This is argely outside our control, though there are perhaps precautio. s which we can take to reduce the risk. I will come to later.
Sing A
(particularly in
The se
3. I agree with the Governor that the occasion of the opening of the Plover Co. Water Scheme might make the, visit more acceptable to the Chinese than a generalised one. In any case, my own feeling is that a violent reaction from the Chinese to this sort of visit is not really in accordance with their usual norms of behaviour. Although I suspect that they might, in fact, attach rather less importance to the visit than we do, it would, I think, be bound to appear to them as provocative on our part, as an assertion of sovereignty and perhaps as a breach of the tacit "live and let live" agreement on Hong Kong. But there is a good chance that they would simply make an entry on their private balance sheet rather than shew. any immediate public reaction. I am also inclined to doubt whether the Russians (who are, after all extremely protocol-minded) would, in the event, choose to pull Chinese legs about it, at any rate publicly. I feel therefore, rather more by instinct than anything else, that a really adverse Chinese reaction is unlikely.
E. Bolland, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON S.W.1
&c
minali
off
my
5 Am7.
· CONFIDENTIAL