8.
9.
10.
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and to embark on a long-term ideological struggle for the hearts
and minds of the people of the Colony.
This switch to a non-violent long-term campaign for popular
support gets Peking "off the hook" with their supporters in
Hong Kong, gives the latter something to keep them busy, gives
themselves (Peking) breathing space in which to lessen Chinese
economic dependence on Hong Kong against the time if/when the
general public of Hong Kong have been won over to Communism and
are waiting for the Colony to be taken over by China.
Provided that the Hong Kong Government:
(a)
(b)
Do not afford the Communists gratuitous opportunities
for crusading on behalf of the masses (e.g. labour
policies, housing, social welfare etc.);
Do not allow their authority to be eroded by the
constant efforts of the Communists to bring about a
Macao-type situation (which still remains the aim of
Peking);
(c)
Does not encounter a major economic crisis leading to
wholesale unemployment in the Colony,
it is most unlikely that the Communists will succeed in winning
the hearts and minds of the people of Hong Kong.
The attitude of the general public in Hong Kong is more
likely to be governed by the knowledge that only 30 years remain
of the lease of the New Territories, without which Hong Kong would
not be a viable entity.
11.
Investment in Hong Kong has always been of a short-term
nature (5-10 years). It seems unlikely that the attitude of the
general public will change noticeably until the 1980's.
They
12.
will then probably start looking over their shoulders to China
against the expiration of the lease of the New Territories and
begin to trim their sails according to the wind from that quarter.
The other development which might prompt China to intervene
in Hong Kong (a substantial lessening of Chinese dependent on
/Hong Kong
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