would stand by (95) and he expected the whole project to fizzle out by 31 March, 1968, by which date the Company have to acknowledge that they were unable to make any headway or that there was no point in pursuing the matter further. He did not seem at all keen to take any initiative to put the project to sleep, his attitude being that it was for the Company to make this move.
3. I saw Mr. Marden on 11 January. I told him
that I could see no prospect of revising ECGD guarantee conditions and that my understanding was that the Hong Kong Government would stand by its letter of 16 December to the Company. I expressed the view that it was really for the Company in these circumstances to make up its mind, after this further round of exchanges with the Hong Kong Government had been formally completed, that there was nothing more to be done and then to get down with the Government to devising a suitable explanation. I suggested (as I had done to Mr. Cowperthwaite) that the failure to proceed with the project might perhaps in some way be attributed to the financial consequences of devaluation, although it was not immediately apparent to me what use might be made of this. He did not
Precis:
A
demur and I got the impression that he might campaign on these lines with his colleagues in the Company when he gets back to Hong Kong.
4.
Pending developments in Hong Kong these papers can be put away.
(w.s. Carter)
19 January, 1968