(1)
Thoughts on Reply to Hong Kong Telegram No. 1759:
Action against Communist Press
Commujant
Is action against the CPO press essential or not?
The Governor has been told that we must do in Hong Kong what is "essential" or "necessary" to maintain our position there, whatever the consequences may be for sino-British relations in general. But it is not sufficient that action should be "highly desirable"?
(a)
(b)
What are the factors?
Influence of Communist press on opinion of the general public, 1.e. does it convert the uncommitted to support the Communist cause?
Does the fact that the law is being flagrantly ignored and not enforced cause erosion of public confidence by implying weakness on the part of Government?
(c) Does unfettered propaganda and incitement of the Communist
press encourage local hardcore Communists to maintain a militant and violent line?
There is no clear evidence on (a) or (b), but (c) must undoubtedly be true. We realise difficulty of establishing essentiality beyond doubt, particularly since the effect of such propaganda tends to be an insidious process of gradual erosion, not easily identifiable. But is there any hard or clear evidence at all (even in the special Branch papers on this subject) that such processes are taking place?
(2) If not essential, we should avoid action because
(a) there are greater dangers for Hong Kong in a violent Peking
reaction, leading Peking to line up in direct support of confrontation;
(b)
@
position of our Embassy staff,
(3) If essential what is the best course to take?
(a) direct and immediate action against the press without
preliminary warning or notice, or
(2)
to see whether any deal can be arrived at with "eking on basis of no strong action if behaviour of Communist press is moderated.
Dangers of (b) are that any bargains struck will give Teking a handle in future for demanding consultation on treatment of CP press; and, if negotiations failed, CPG reaction might well be stronger than under (a) because Peking will have taken up formally a hard line on the issue and would find it difficult to back down.
/(4)