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China into intervention in Hong Kong and of reprisals against the staff of
our Mission in Peking or against Mr. Grey, the Reuters' correspondent under house arrest in Peking (or, indeed, against any other British subjects in China).
9. There are certain arguments in favour of taking comprehensive powers against the Press. The taking of any special powers to deal with the Press is likely to produce a reaction from Peking: it could be argued that it might in the long run pay to face this once and for all by taking all the
powers we are likely to need at one go. An additional argument is the possible deterrent effect of this on the C.P.G.-owned Press, as an indication
that the Hong Kong Government means business.
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10. But there are strong reasons against taking comprehensive powers. possess but not to use them would be very difficult to justify and there would be considerable public pressure to close down all remaining Communist newspapers. If this were done, there would be a very strong C.P.G. reaction and it could hardly be expected that they would refrain from reprisals. Moreover, the deterrent effect of the mere existence of these powers is very doubtful. The successful prosecution of the three independently-owned Communist newspapers has had little effect on the rest of the Communist Press; their tone has, however, recently moderated probably, we think, in preparation for the National Day celebrations on 1st October. If action has to be taken against the C.F.G.-owned newspapers then it might be better to do so under the existing law (as was done in the case of the three newspapers already suspended) which has proved much more speedy and effective than
anticipated..
11.
The arguments in favour of taking limited emergency powers are firstly, that it would achieve the immediate objective of the Hong Kong authorities and would run far less risk of provoking a sharp reaction from the C.P.G. Secondly, it would leave untouched the main Communist newspapers themselves although it might involve action against their presses and premises if these were being used to produce the broadsheets.
12. The Acting Governor has expressed a strong preference for taking only limited powers (Hong Kong telegram No.1358) and the Governor has endorsed this view in discussions here. Emergency Regulations which would make illegal the production, distribution and possession of broadsheets have been prepared in Hong Kong; the latter have been so defined as specifically to exclude recognised newsp pers. The Executive Council has agreed that the Governor can bring these into force in his discretion. Our conclusion is that the Governor should be authorised to promulgate them if necessary.
Hong Kong Department,
Commonwealth Office,
27th September, 1967.
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