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supporting them. This has failed; and although the Communist newspapers have been largely discredited and rejected by public opinion, it was considered essential, if public confidence was to be maintained, that

some action against them should be taken if only to show that the

Government was not afraid to tackle the Communist Press. The three

newspapers against which action was taken were minor independently-owned

pro-Communist organs. They were deliberately selected in an attempt to

minimise the danger of reaction in Peking. No action has been taken as yet against the main C.P.G.-owned or backed newspapers.

6. The suspension of the three newspapers has been followed by the

appearance of single sheet "mosquito" broadsheets reproducing items

from the main newspapers. They have been widely distributed free of

charge. At first little importance was attached by the Hong Kong authorities to their circulation. They have, however, subsequently

been used to indicate targets for assassination and to issue terrorist

warnings. On the 28th August, six prominent persons (including two

Chinese unofficial members of the Executive Council; the Chinese Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs; an Editor and a Publisher of the anti- Communist Press) were named as targets for assassination; on the same

day a small warning parcel bomb was posted to one of the Executive Councillors (the bomb was detected and safely dealt with). This

development has necessarily completely changed the attitude of the

Hong Kong authorities towards the broadsheets and the Governor considers

that action must be taken to deal with them in order to maintain public

confidence in the ability of the Hong Kong Government to control the

situation and to prevent an excess of confidence on the part of the Communists (of which there are some indications) because of any apparent

weakness in that control.

7. There appear to be two courses open to us, namely:-

(a) to introduce comprehensive emergency regulations giving

full power to deal with the Press generally.

(b) To introduce emergency regulations giving power to deal

specifically and solely with the broadsheets.

We asked Hong Kong to consider these (our telegram No.1840).

8. The primary considerations to be borne in mind in deciding which

course of action to follow are, on the one hand, the need of the Hong

Kong authorities to preserve public confidence and to control the

situation in the Colony and, on the other hand, the danger of provoking

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