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their own runtling Harasunent of individual limuricans and exploitation of disputes involving U.S. Servicemen could occur on a minor soale and it is possible that there may be an increase in propaganda attacks on visits by U.S. ships; in particular visits by nuclear powered ships such as U.S.S. Enterprise could provide a foous for agitation.
Russian Propaganda.
3.
Izvestia has recently attacked China again over its lukewarm support of North Vietnam and its equivocal attitude to Hong Kong. In the recent past, the Chinese have ignored these diatribes but they may become more sensitive if the situation of the Vietcong worsens significantly.
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM.
:
4.
It is assumed, for the purposes of this paper, that the Americans will not accept a military defeat in Vietnam. The immediate consequence of any further reverses could be an increased build-up and a harder line over bombing the North backed, at least temporarily, by a more favourable climate of opinion at home. The danger is of further escalation into an invasion of the North or the use of tactical nuclear weapons or both.
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IMPACT ON HONG KONG.
5.
In the event of the Vietcong suffering a severe setback, it is possible that the Chinese Communists would intensify their anti-U.S. campaign in H.K. in various ways, including demonstrations and boycotts, with the aim of denying R. & R. facilities and showing support for the Vietcong. There seems little advantage to be gained except as a propaganda gesture and the Chinese authorities are likely to be fully conscious of the fact that such a campaign could be difficult to control.
6.
If the tempo of the war increases much would depend on the attitude of H.M.G. towards developments in Vietnam but a general anti-American campaign in H.K. might also be instigated by the C.P.G. authorities despite the problems of controlling and limiting its scope. Restrictions on R. & R. might then become necessary. A threat of North Vietnamese or C.P.G. inspired sabotage to U.S. establishments and property here, especially to ships and aircraft, could develop. There would be considerable problems, particularly logistic, for the North Vietnamese in mounting such attacks in the Colony, although ships plying between Hong Kong and Haiphong might be used. Although it seems unlikely that the North Vietnamese would attempt such action in the Colony without C.P.G. approval, there should nonetheless be greater surveillance of ships coming from Haiphong. The C.P.G. has the capacity to mount such a campaign without great difficulty,
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