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always able to exert its authority).
In such a situation
there is a possibility that local groups or leaders may
take anti-fiong Kong initiatives even against the wishes of
the central suthorities. Once any action is taken Feking
could feel bound to back its supporters.
Future Frospec ́s in Hong Kong
14. If Peking decides to back its supporters in an all-out
confrontation to drive us out of Hong Kong then our position
will quickly become untenable. Public confidence and
morale will collapse very rapidly and there will be a rush
to come to terms with the other side. There is nothing
we could do to prevent this. We would have to withdraw as
beat we could. Va do not rate very high the prospects of
our being able to negotiate an orderly withdrawal.
15. If the present situation continues, with
controlled
low-level of activity designed to annoy and harass us, there
seems no reason why we abould not be able to hold on in
Hong Kong indefinitely (or at least untål mich nearer the
time when the lease of the Her Teritories expires in 1997).
We think this can be done even if the Chinese resort to such
measures as cutting off food and water supplies, although
they are unlikely to do this except as part of a policy of
all-out confrontation because it would make them unpopular
with the mass of the people. The key to this situation is
the maintenance of public confidence; and to do this wo
must continue to contain the Communist activities with firm
but restrained messures, woi ing my notion which would
make it more difficult for Peking to disengage itself from
its present involvement.
16. There is, of course, the danger that, in the absence of
instructions from the central authorities or in a situation
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