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repitition of this, in circumstances which showed that we were
unable to react, would enable China to claim that we were responsi-
ble for a gap in their own air defences and provide a good excuse
for Chinese aircraft to patrol Hong Kong's air space.
7. There is another point. The despatch of fighters from the
United Kingdom to deal with any incident involving China must
appear as a political act and could exacerbate the situation in a
way that the reactions of forces based locally would not do.
8. The Governor during his recent visit made certain tentative
proposals for a small fighter unit backed by a Hong Kong Auxiliary
Air Force component and taking into account the facilities for
maintenance provided locally by the Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering
Corporation. This is being studied, I understand, in the Air
Force department. The Governor's plan envisages that the Hong Kong
Government will take responsibility for the greater part of the
operating costs; it assumes, however, that the Hong Kong Govern-
ment would not be required to purchase the aircraft. This, I
think, is a very helpful proposition and, provided that there are
no technical or military objections, possibly indicates an accept-
able solution.
Apportionment of Costs
9. The paper argues that certain elements of our forces can be
regarded as having substantially an internal security role. For
a number of reasons I consider that the argument does not carry
conviction: the selection of units in this category is, in fact,
described in the annex to the paper as "somewhat arbitrary" (para
11).
10.
Take the minesweepers as an example. as the brigates
They are as much a
factor/in
in deterring Chinese intrusion into Hong Kong waters, as they
are in helping to deter illegal immigration and smuggling.
11. In my view the attempt to differentiate between external
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/defence