SECRET
(covering TOP SECRET annex)
Apportionment of Costs
9.
The paper argues that certain elements of our forces can be
regarded as having substantially an internal security role. For
a number of reasons I consider that the argument does not carry
conviction: the selection of units in this category is, in fact,
described in the annex to the paper as "somewhat arbitrary" (para
11).
10. Take the minesweepers as an example. They are as much a
factor as the frigates in deterring Chinese intrusion into Hong
Kong waters.
11.
In my view the attempt to differentiate between external defence
and internal security is unrealistic in the circumstances of
Hong Kong. The external and internal threats to the Colony are
from the same source. If China wishes to bring pressure to bear
or take over the Colony we can be fairly certain that this will
be done by fomenting and exploiting an internal security situation.
12. I entirely endorse a view expressed by the Foreign Secretary
in a letter to the Defence Secretary. He wrote: "I do not think
that it is realistic to seek to isolate a uniquely military
role for a services presence which insofar as it is indispensable
for the maintenance of morale and confidence in the Colony is a
buttress for our position in all its aspects."
13. We should not therefore rely on any such artificial division
of forces in reaching a decision as to what constitutes a proper
charge on Defence votes. Nor is it reasonable to expect Hong Kong
to contribute on that basis to the cost of the military forces we
consider it necessary to station there, particularly since the
SECRET
(covering TOP SECRET annex)
/increases