7
}
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Other Costing Factors
ANNEX A TO
CINCFE 3031/6130/12 Dated 24th September 1968
50. Under eithor Scheme A or Scheme B the main elements of the operating costs of the unit would remain to be met. On the assumption that ultimate financial responsibility would rest with the Hong Kong Government this would call for a financial adjustment between that government and the Ministry of Defence. Consideration has been given to the possibility of reducing the size of such a See financial adjustment by the direct provision by the Hong Kong Government of further local services but this has not produced any helpful result. However,
it is understood that the existing agreement between HG and the Hong Kong Government on the latter's defence contribution expires at the end of 1970/71 and in negotiations for a now settlement which might need to be opened some time next year it might be possible to provide for the Hong Kong Government to liquidate its liability or part of its liability for the cost of the Hunter unit by assuming additional responsibility for the provision of works services in Hong Kong for the use of HG.
OTHER ASPECTS
Y
Unit Identity
51. Aircraft of No 209 Squadron were at Hong Kong shortly after WWII, and its official number plate is now "No 209 (Hong Kong) Squadron". It is considered that to allocate this number plate to the Hunter unit would be a continuing reminder to residents of the Colony that they have a stake and share in their own defence, and would demonstrate the close association of the Royal Air Force unit with the Colony. It is also considered that a unit established with a RAF number plate would have a greater prestige and deterrent effect than a unit named, for instance, Hong Kong Air Defence Squadron.
52. At present No 209 Squadron is equipped with Pioneers, and is based at Seletar. It will be disbanded in December 1968.
Command and Control
53. In April 1970, Hong Kong will become an independent command, and it would be appropriate to extend the operational command of Commander British Forces Hong Kong, and to extend the full command of the Officer Commanding RAF Kai Tak, to embrace the Hunter unit. This would apply irrespective of whether Scheme A or Scheme B were adopted.
54.
Should Scheme A be adopted, it would be necessary to provide administrative links to the Government. This could best be achieved by providing an administrative channel about HKAAF matters between the Commanding Officer of the Hunter unit and the Officer Commanding Hong Kong Auxiliary Air Force.
General Matters
55. It is considered that:
a.
Because the unmanned strip at Sek Kong is the only alternative field for Hunters operating from Kai Tak, it must be improved to a minimum standard for day and night emergency use. Action is in hand to meet this requirement for our present detachment commitments.
الله
A
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