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ANNEX A to DP 9/68(C) (Draft)(Continued)
In an emergency, reinforcements can be provided from the Far
East Air Force and from outside the theatre.
IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRA VAI PROM
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE
Chinese Reaction
16. The situation nearly four years hence will inevi tably be
affected by any outcome of the Vietnamese war. However, the
external threat to Hong Kong is likely to remain unchanged so long
as United States forces remain in the Far East and the uncertainty
of American reaction to any Chinese aggression still exists.
China will be aware that reinforcements for the Hong Kong Garrison
will have to come from the European theatre after the closure of
our main base at Singapore, and, consequently, may exploit the
psychological effect on the inhabitants of the colony of the com-
parative isolation of Pritish Forces. Also, with all Gurkha forces
concentrated initially in the colony, there is the opportunity for
China to bring pressure to bear on Nepal, which might inhibit the
usefulness of the Gurkhas.
Hong Kong Reaction
17. The completion of withdrawal of forces from Malaysia and
Singapore will be apparent to the population of Hong Kong.
Their morale will be particularly sensitive to the knowledge that
there will be no reserves for British forces available in the
theatre and that reinforcements will then have to come from Europe.
In these circumstances any decrease in the strength of the garrison
could seriously affect confidence by casting doubt
on HM Government's intention to maintain a presence in Hong Kong.
RATIONALE FOR FUTURE FORCE LEVELS
Royal Navy
18. The requirement already established to keep one frigate perma-
nently in Hong Kong will have to be met from the Western Fleet,
after the withdrawal of the Far Fast Fleet from Singapore.
Owing
A - 7
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