UK EYES ONLY
SECRET Part I to COS 16th Meeting/68
12th March 1968
B.
Southern Yemen
SIR CHARLES ELWORTHY said they would have seen the minute from the Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State, setting out his views on the presence of the Naval Task Force off Aden and in which he suggested that HMS EAGLE should not move East of Singapore until the situation in Southern Yemen became clearer. They would recall that the Task Force was at present at five days notice (10). It was most likely that the situation in Southern Yemen would remain unsettled for a considerable period and he considered that our present commitment for the Naval Task Force could not be maintained indefinitely. It was unlikely that we would be able to maintain the Task Force, as presently constituted, after May 1968, when further negotiations on aid to Southern Yemen would take place. They should resist the commitment becoming an indefinite one and he considered that they should brief the Secretary of State accordingly.
They had already emphasised the fact that no "rescue operation" against organised opposition could be guaranteed to succeed (11). Should evacuation of our dependants become necessary he considered that it should be attempted first by the use of civil aircraft. Only if this proved impossible should evacuation by military means be considered.
As regards Command and Control (12) of the Naval Task Force he considered that until a military evacuation had been ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, should have operational control of the Task Force and that the Ministry of Defence would only decide its composition and state of readiness. It was essential, however, that control should be vested in the Ministry of Defence from the time an evacuation was ordered, as from that time decisions would have to be taken at Ministerial level and at very short notice. Control by the Chiefs of Staff would ensure the quickest transmission of orders to the Task Force at such a crucial time.
GENERAL CARVER said that the indefinite continuation of this commitment would have a serious effect on training and exercises, particularly the SEATO Exercise TAMARAW. To be able to participate in this exercise, in which we were providing the bulk of the Naval Forces, ships would have to be at 10 days notice by 15th April 1968, and some would have to go to 14 days notice, If this degree of notice could not be given then we should have to reduce our contribution to the exercise probably to a LPD and a few escorts; we should have to explain to our Allies why we were unable to participate. This would prejudice the
security which we had been at pains to maintain on the movements of this Task Force, He would be able to rotate
Notes:
90
10.
11.
12.
FS/68/33 dated 7th March 1968.
RTT/111500Z Jan/MOD UK to CTF 317%
COS 13th Meeting/68, Minute 1.
COS 1162/1/3/68€
- 7
SECRET
UK EYES ONLY