SECRET
UK EYES ONLY
ANNEX A TO COS 23/68 (Continued)
that there will be no reserves of British forces available in
the theatre and that reinforcements will then have to come from Europe. In these circumstances much will depend on buoying up the expectations of both Europeans and Asians and avoiding a crisis of confidence. Any reduction in the strength of our forces in Hong Kong at that stage could well affect the confidence of police and public by casting doubt on HM Government's intention to maintain a military presence in the Colony.
Royal Navy
RATIONALE FOR FUTURE FORCE LEVELS
18. The requirement already established to keep one frigate permanently in Hong Kong will have to be met from the Western Fleet, after the withdrawal of the Far East Fleet from Singapore. Owing to the increased length of passage time, the reinforcement required in times of tension can only be met if a second frigate remains within a few days steaming of Hong Kong, and is based there. One of these frigates is also likely to continue to be declared to the United Nations Command Korea; this commitment is currently under review by political departments. The further requirement to keep two MCM vessels at operational readiness, together with two further MCM vessels available in times of tension, can only be met by basing them on Hong Kong.
A
19. With the loss of Singapore-based fleet maintenance and logistic facilities the following increases will be required in Hong Kong:
20.
as:
a.
A small increase in personnel and stores in HMS TAMAR.
The provision of one small tanker, to guard against the loss of commercial shore fucl facilities through strike action or subversion, and to support the UN Command frigate if deployed.
The minimum naval force requirements are therefore summarised
2.
Two frigates. One as guardship (also declared ship
to United Nations Command in South Korca), one as reinforce-
mont.
not much
'base'
}
A-7
SECRET
UK EYES ONLY