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13. There are obvious disadvantages in sending more troops to Hong Kong now. It could easily be interpreted as an assumption that we assumed that the situation was going to deteriorate, perhaps to the extent of developing into one of those "open-ended commitments" which are so unpopular.
This could call into question and invite public debate of the whole future of the Colony. Although in some ways reinforcement on this scale might bring confidence to Hong Kong, it is probable that the general effect would be the opposite. It would almost certainly be regarded by the CPG as a step in military escalation. Even if they (whoever "they" are) did not wish to regard it as such, certain elements locally and in Peking would expect them to take some appropriate similar action. The last thing it is in our interests to do is turn the present "confrontation" into a military one.
Recommendations
14. First of all it is clear that it would be close to reckless folly in those circumstances to suggest reductions in the permanent garrison, and it is clearly unreasonable to look for economics. Premature discharge of a few locally enlisted personnel for the sake of saving trifling sums would show a lack of sense of proportion. Secondly, it will almost certainly be necessary to keep one additional battalion there when 2/7th Gurkha Rifles are due to return to Malaysia, which I now intend should be in late October, after the "Double Tenth" danger period. In fact if Hong Kong has to remain at its present state of operational rondiness for long, it will be necessary to provide some additional staff as emergency reinforcements.
15. I would not wish to put another battalion at short notice to reinforce Hong Kong until a situation had arisen in which the troops now there were employed in support of the police on a scale considerably beyond that obtaining at present. If I had to do so, it could come from within my resources, unless un- expected additional commitments rise elsewhere. If this second battalion were despatched, serious consideration should be given at the time to putting into effect in an orderly fashion the withdrawal of families and the conversion of Hong Kong into an unaccompanied station, at least as far as UK units are concerned. If the situation deteriorated further, or if at the time this scale of reinforcement was not considered adoquito, two further battalions and a small brigade headquarters with the necessary supporting services required should be sent from the UK to Hong Kong, the vehicles and equipment being shipped there from Singapore. At this stage, if it had not already been effected, all Service families should be removed.
16.
These recommendations are supported by my Service Commanders. I believe they would be supported by the Officer Administering the Government. As I have already explained, CBF would prefer to have this full scale reinforcement now, but recognises the arguments against it.
Organisation
17. None of the authorities in Hong Kong, Government, Police or Military, are geared to deal with a continuous state of near-cmergency. Their "action stations" are designed to meet
a sudden crisis in public order which may be on a large scale but is not expected to last a long time. If, as is generally
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