TOP SECRET
DP Note 27/67(A) (Flimsy Draft) (Continued)
of the Commander-in-Chief's proposals are as follows:
a.
Morale in Hong Kong. The crux of the problem of
Hong Kong is the maintenance of confidence in the
Administration.
Although the arrival of relief units
on unaccompanied tours may not have such an unfavourable
impact on confidence in Hong Kong, as might the evacua-
tion of families already there, it should be born in mind
that an announcement to this effect will have to be made
at least three months before the first relief, ie by
31st March 1968, and is likely to encourage communist
elements to make capital out of the decision.
b.
Army Force Levels
(1) The planned world-wide force levels from 1971
onwards are geared to provide an all-British garrison
in Hong Kong by 1975, consisting of the following
units on a fully accompanied basis:
One armoured car squadron
One light regiment
Five infantry battalions.
TOTAL 63
that by
(2) The Commander-in-Chief recommends that from 1970
onwards the Hong Kong garrison is increased by one
battalion on an unaccompanied basis, rotated every
six to nine months from the United Kingdom;
the mid-Seventies, when all Gurkhas have been replaced
by equivalent British units, the whole of the garrison
should be on an unaccompanied basis, less one battalion
and static units and headquarters on the Island, which
would continue to be accompanied.
(3) To implement the above recommendations and still
fulfil the capability to meet the assumed limited war/
internal security commitments, will necessitate a
considerable increase in the long term Army force levels.
This could, for example, amount to as much as thrce
5 -
TOP SECRET