SECRET
5.
(including the French) support this view.
As Mr. Hopson points out, the Chinese
leadership might welcome another foreign
diversion. There could also be
a spontaneous reaction by local Chinese in
Hong Kong or Red Guards in the neighbouring
Chinese provinces, which Peking would find
it difficult to discountenance, even if
they wanted to do so.
The Governor of Hong Kong, as is apparent
from histelegram No. 153, is clearly in two
minds about the advisability of allowing the
exercise to proceed. He agrees that it could
cause serious difficulties;
he says that he
would have been far happier if it had not been
planned and that, if a decision had to be taken
now, he would almost certainly have to advise
cancellation as being the only safe course.
!
The Governor also, however, puts the arguments
for allowing the exercise to proceed under
certain conditions (paragraph 9 of histelegram
No. 153). These conditions do not, I must say,
seen desirable or practicable. The first
condition is unacceptable: to stop the
exercise after it starts, presumably under
Chinese pressure would be to give the latter
another "outstanding victory" after Macao.
Also we do not see how we could guarantee,
as the Governor implies, that publicity should
be strictly confined.' As regards the third
condition, even if the narrative is not disclosed
the nature of the exercise would be fairly
obvious. The Governor also auggests that we
can afford to wait a little longer before
deciding to cancel.
There must now be very few
/days