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(b) The press were told on 26 January (paragraph 6 of Hong
Kong telegram No. 153) that this amphibious exercise
was to take place. It attracted little attention. But,
because of developments in China, there is an unusually
large number of foreign correspondents in Hong Kong, es
well as a B.B.C. team. It might be possible to dissuade
the British press from playing up this exercise;
this is by no means certain, and the foreigners would
write it up as they wished.
but
(c) The Chinese would in any case know of the exercise and
become aware of its nature. In commenting on likely
Chinese reactions in his telegram No. 142 (attached),
our Chargé d'Affaires in Peking admits that it is, at
this stage, difficult to say what these would be, but
considers we might get away with it provided there is no
American participation. However, he gives various
reasons for concluding also that the risk of a violent
Chinese reaction cannot be excluded. We consider that
there is a very real risk that the Chinese would regard
a large military exercise of this nature in Hong Kong at
this time as a military provocation and that, for this
reason alone, they would react violently to it,
The present extreme phase of the Cultural Revolution,
the recent successful pressure exerted on the Portuguese
in Macao and the fierce action currently being taken by
the Chinese in Peking against foreign Embassies and their
personnel (including the French) support this view.
SECRET
/As